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________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________________ 
 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
Statutes of limitations can be tricky. What events trigger 
them may present thorny questions. And when courts may toll 
them can involve judgment calls. Because of the way that 
Christopher Blake and James Orkis have brought their class 
action, this case presents both kinds of issues. And they need 
to win on both to make their suit timely. 
In 2005 and 2006, Blake and Orkis took out mortgages 
from JP Morgan to buy homes. Then in 2013, they filed a class 
action against JP Morgan under the Real Estate Settlement and 
Procedures Act, alleging a scheme to refer homeowners to 
mortgage insurers in exchange for streams of kickbacks. But 
the Act has a one-year statute of limitations that runs from the 
date of the violation. 12 U.S.C. § 2614. So Blake and Orkis 
need to bridge the gap from when they closed their mortgages 
in 2005 and 2006 to when they sued in 2013. 
They raise two theories, each of which bridges only half the 
gap. First, Blake and Orkis argue that each kickback separately 
violates the Act and has its own limitations period. In other 
words, they argue that the Act follows the separate-accrual 
rule. JP Morgan disagrees, arguing that the Act’s statute of lim-
itations runs only from the mortgage closing, not from each 
later kickback. But the Act’s plain text makes each kickback a 
violation, so the limitations period accrues separately from the 
date of each kickback. 
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That theory gets them only halfway there. The kickbacks 
ended more than a year before they sued, so the Act’s one-year 
limitations period would still bar their claims. To make their 
2013 suit timely, Blake and Orkis next try to piggyback on a 
different class action filed in 2011 that raised the same claims 
against JP Morgan. As members of that putative class, they say 
that we should toll the limitations period under American Pipe 
& Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). But in China 
Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, the Supreme Court reasoned that a 
timely class action should never toll other class actions under 
American Pipe. 138 S. Ct. 1800 (2018). Blake and Orkis try 
but fail to distinguish China Agritech. So they are not entitled 
to American Pipe tolling, and their suit is untimely. We will 
thus affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 A. Blake and Orkis’s allegations 
1. The mortgage insurance market. Before banks will enter 
into a home mortgage, they usually expect a 20% down pay-
ment. But many home buyers cannot pay that much up front. 
Banks are willing to lend to these buyers on a condition: that 
they buy mortgage insurance to protect against default.  
The mortgage insurers, in turn, often reinsure these mort-
gages. Typically, they assign part of the risk to a reinsurer in 
exchange for giving up part of the insurance premiums. Ideally, 
reinsurance thus spreads risk and lets people buy homes who 
otherwise could not. 
2. Blake and Orkis’s claims. But Blake and Orkis allege 
that this system was rife with abuse. Each bought a home and 
took out a mortgage from JP Morgan. Because they paid less 
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than 20% up front, they had to buy mortgage insurance. JP 
Morgan referred each of them to specific mortgage insurers, 
who then reinsured with Cross Country Insurance.  
But Cross Country is a subsidiary of JP Morgan. So accord-
ing to Blake and Orkis, this was a classic kickback scheme: JP 
Morgan referred home buyers to mortgage insurers in ex-
change for kickbacks, funneled through its subsidiary as insur-
ance premiums. Any reinsurance, they claim, was just a cover 
for the kickback scheme.  
Federal regulators apparently agreed. After the financial 
crisis, they clamped down on these alleged practices, getting 
consent decrees against several leading mortgage reinsurers 
that banned these captive-reinsurance arrangements for ten 
years. These decrees, however, did not come in time for Blake 
and Orkis. They both claim that their mortgage insurers paid 
kickbacks through 2012 and 2013.  
3. The Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act. Blake 
and Orkis claim that the kickbacks violate 12 U.S.C. § 2607 of 
the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (RESPA or the 
Act), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–17. The Act is designed to eliminate 
kickbacks and other fees that raise the cost of “settlement ser-
vices” related to mortgage closings, like mortgage insurance. 
Id. §§ 2601(b)(2), 2602(3). So it bans giving or receiving “any 
fee, kickback, or thing of value pursuant to any agreement or 
understanding” that either party will refer these services to the 
other. Id. § 2607. 
This section of the Act has a one-year statute of limitations. 
Id. § 2614. And that limitations period runs “from the date of 
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the occurrence of the violation.” Id. This case turns in part on 
defining the violation that triggers the statute of limitations. 
B. Procedural history 
1. The 2011 Samp lawsuit. Blake and Orkis were not the 
first to make these claims. In 2011, a group of plaintiffs filed a 
class-action suit against JP Morgan in California, bringing the 
same claims as Blake and Orkis. Samp v. JP Morgan Chase 
Bank, N.A., No. EDCV 11-1950, 2013 WL 1912869, at *2 
(C.D. Cal. May 7, 2013). Though Blake and Orkis were not 
named plaintiffs, they belonged to Samp’s putative class of all 
those who took out mortgages from JP Morgan in or after 2004. 
But the District Court in California dismissed that case as un-
timely in May 2013. Id. at *5, *10. The Samp plaintiffs ap-
pealed.  
In November 2013, several of the Samp plaintiffs’ lawyers 
changed their litigation strategy. They filed a new class action, 
with Blake and Orkis as the named plaintiffs, in federal district 
court in Pennsylvania. The very next day, they asked the Ninth 
Circuit to dismiss their Samp appeal. Two days after that, the 
court granted that motion and put an end to Samp.  
2. This lawsuit. Blake and Orkis picked up where Samp left 
off. They too sought to represent a class of those who took out 
mortgages from JP Morgan in or after 2004. But they them-
selves had taken out their mortgages in 2005 and 2006, at least 
seven years before they filed their complaint in 2013. So JP 
Morgan moved to dismiss their suit as barred by the Act’s one-
year statute of limitations. Blake and Orkis had to bridge at 
least a seven-year gap. 
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They tried to bridge it in two ways. First, they claimed that 
the Act makes each kickback a violation with its own limita-
tions period—a separately accruing wrong. And they claimed 
that their mortgage insurers paid a kickback to JP Morgan 
(through Cross Country) each time they paid an insurance pre-
mium. They continued to pay these premiums for years after 
their mortgages closed. So under that theory, their suit would 
be timely up to one year after the last kickback. 
But Blake and Orkis concede that they had paid no premi-
ums in the year before their complaint. The statute of limita-
tions would thus have expired in the year or two before they 
filed their own suit in 2013. 
Blake and Orkis’s lawyers, however, filed Samp in Decem-
ber 2011. So second, Blake and Orkis argued that the filing of 
Samp tolled the limitations period for their claims. They rea-
soned that they were members of Samp’s putative class and 
were bringing the same claims as in Samp. And because Samp 
continued until November 2013, they claimed that American 
Pipe tolling would extend their limitations period until then 
and make their suit timely. 
In other words, Blake and Orkis needed both theories to 
make their suit timely. They needed the separate-accrual rule 
to justify starting the limitations period for some kickbacks at 
the end of 2010. And they needed American Pipe tolling to 
span the period from 2011 to 2013, when they filed their own 
suit. 
The District Court agreed with the first theory, but not the 
second. Blake v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 13-6433, 
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2018 WL 1518613, at *4-8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2018). It held 
that each kickback is a separately accruing wrong with its own 
limitations period. Id. at *4-5. But it also held that American 
Pipe tolling does not apply to a second class action filed before 
the end of the first one. Id. at *7-8. So the District Court held 
that the suit was untimely and dismissed it. 
Blake and Orkis appealed. We review the dismissal of a 
complaint de novo, accepting the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded alle-
gations as true. Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 290 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
II. UNDER RESPA, THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR  
EACH KICKBACK ACCRUES SEPARATELY  
Blake and Orkis first need a theory to span the time from at 
least 2006 to 2010. There are two possibilities: the separate-
accrual rule and the continuing-violations doctrine. Blake and 
Orkis invoke the separate-accrual rule, claiming that each kick-
back is a discrete violation with its own limitations period.  
JP Morgan replies that the only alleged violations were at 
the mortgage closings in 2005 and 2006. But much of JP Mor-
gan’s argument targets the continuing-violations doctrine, 
largely ignoring the separate-accrual rule. So the parties argue 
past each other. And the text of the Act is clear: each kickback 
is a separately accruing violation.  
A. We can decide this question 
But first, Blake and Orkis argue that we cannot even reach 
this issue because they did not raise it on appeal and JP Morgan 
did not cross-appeal. The District Court held that the separate-
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accrual rule applied, so Blake and Orkis appealed only the 
American Pipe issue. And without an appeal or cross-appeal, 
we may not modify a judgment or change the parties’ rights. 
Morley Const. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 300 U.S. 185, 191 (1937). 
But we can affirm for any reason in the record. Id.; Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cosenza, 258 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 
2001). And both the separate-accrual rule and American Pipe 
tolling go to the same basic question: is Blake’s and Orkis’s 
suit timely? JP Morgan says no, because there were no new 
wrongs after 2006. If we agreed, then we would affirm without 
changing the judgment or altering the parties’ rights. Cf. Con-
nell v. Trs. of the Pension Fund of the Ironworkers Dist. Coun-
cil of N. N.J., 118 F.3d 154, 156-158 (3d Cir. 1997) (dismissing 
suit as time-barred without a cross-appeal). So we can reach 
this question without a cross-appeal. 
B. The Act’s plain text provides that the limitations pe-
riod accrues separately for each kickback 
1. Separate accrual, not continuing violations. We must 
decide which actions trigger the statute of limitations: the clos-
ings or the individual kickbacks. The “standard rule” is that a 
federal cause of action accrues, and the limitations period starts 
to run, when and only when “the plaintiff can file suit and ob-
tain relief” for that particular wrong. Bay Area Laundry & Dry 
Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 
192, 201 (1997). “Congress has been operating against the 
background rule recognized in Bay Area Laundry for a very 
long time.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 38 (2001) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). We have no reason to 
depart from it here. 
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 A corollary of the standard rule is the separate-accrual rule. 
In other words, “when a defendant commits successive viola-
tions, the statute of limitations runs separately from each vio-
lation.” Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 
671 (2014). The separate-accrual rule governs laws that ban 
discrete wrongs, like copying a copyrighted work or defraud-
ing investors. Id.; see Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 447-48 
(2013). Because each act violates the law on its own, each act 
separately triggers its own limitations period. Petrella, 572 
U.S. at 671. And because each violation is its own claim, plain-
tiffs can sue only for those claims that were timely when they 
filed suit. Id. at 671-72. 
But not all wrongs are discrete wrongs. Some wrongs are 
diffuse and comprise many acts over a period of time, like hos-
tile work environments. E.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). These are called continuing 
violations. No single act may be enough to make out a claim. 
So the statute of limitations runs from the last act of the illegal 
conduct. Id. at 118. And though the last act triggers the statute 
of limitations, a plaintiff challenging a continuing violation 
may sue for all acts that make out his claim, even acts that pre-
date the limitations period. See id. at 122. 
So which rule applies depends on the wording of the law. 
If the law forbids a discrete act, as most do, then the separate-
accrual rule governs each act. But if it forbids diffuse conduct, 
comprising many acts at different times, then the continuing-
violation doctrine applies. Petrella, 572 U.S. at 671-72 nn.6 & 
7. 
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The parties argue past each other about which doctrine ap-
plies to Blake and Orkis’s case. Blake and Orkis say that this 
is a separate-accrual case. But JP Morgan argues that this is a 
continuing-violations case—while denying that this doctrine 
applies and saying that the only violation was at closing.  
2. The plain text. The separate-accrual rule applies here be-
cause the Act forbids the discrete act of giving or taking a kick-
back.  
Like many laws, the Act’s one-year statute of limitations 
runs “from the date of the occurrence of the violation.” 12 
U.S.C. § 2614. So when the limitations period starts turns on 
what the violation is. Section 2607(a) in turn bans “giv[ing]” 
or “accept[ing] any fee, kickback, or thing of value pursuant to 
any agreement or understanding . . . that business incident to or 
a part of a real estate settlement service . . . shall be referred to 
any person.” 
As the text says, the precise conduct that violates the Act is 
giving or accepting a kickback. The agreement to make refer-
rals is only an attendant circumstance. An agreement must ex-
ist at the time of the kickback, but an agreement on its own 
does not violate § 2607(a). So a party violates the Act anew 
each time it takes the discrete act of giving or receiving a kick-
back under an agreement to make referrals.  
JP Morgan rightly insists that the continuing-violations 
doctrine does not apply here. But that is beside the point. The 
Act does not require Blake and Orkis to show a diffuse scheme 
of illegal conduct, encompassing many kickbacks—it forbids 
even a single a kickback for a single referral. 12 U.S.C. 
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§ 2607(a). So the separate-accrual rule applies, giving each dis-
crete kickback its own limitations period. 
3. JP Morgan’s textual arguments. JP Morgan disagrees. 
It claims that one can violate the Act only at closing, when one 
agrees to the stream of kickbacks. It offers many textual and 
policy arguments. None has merit. 
First, JP Morgan argues that the Act’s statute of limitations 
runs from the date of the “violation,” singular. Id. § 2614. So it 
reasons that the Act forbids only a single act like agreeing to 
kickbacks, not receiving individual kickbacks repeated over 
time. But the reference to a single “violation” changes nothing. 
The Act forbids even a single kickback, and each kickback is a 
singular violation. 
Second, JP Morgan claims that the Act focuses on mort-
gage closings to reduce the costs of settlement services. Id. 
§ 2601. According to JP Morgan, this focus means that only 
actions at closing violate the Act. But the Act’s stated purpose 
is “the elimination of kickbacks or referral fees that tend to in-
crease unnecessarily the costs of certain settlement services.” 
Id. § 2601(b)(2) (emphasis added). So the Act focuses on ban-
ning any kickback for referring settlement services, and giving 
or taking that kickback violates the Act’s text. See id. 
§ 2607(a). Those kickbacks, whether paid at closing or later, 
could increase the cost of settlement services for everyone. 
Third, JP Morgan says the Act forbids giving or taking a 
“thing of value” for referrals, which includes the agreement at 
closing for kickbacks. Id. § 2607(a). We need not decide 
whether an agreement to provide kickbacks would amount to a 
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separate violation of the Act. Cf. Snow v. First Am. Title Ins. 
Co., 332 F.3d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting an attempt to 
split one discrete kickback into separate violations). Even if an 
agreement for kickbacks did qualify, so would the actual kick-
backs. And the statute does not require that the kickback be 
paid at closing. The one-year limitations period runs separately 
from the giving or taking of each discrete kickback, whether 
paid at closing or later. 
4. JP Morgan’s policy arguments. Because the separate-
accrual rule governs, JP Morgan’s policy arguments also lack 
merit. For example, it fears that letting Blake and Orkis sue 
will extend the statute of limitations for too long. It frets that 
this lawsuit will prompt others to wait before suing, letting 
memories fade and evidence decay. And it worries that restart-
ing the statute of limitations for each kickback will treat like 
plaintiffs unalike, depending on how the defendants structured 
their conduct.  
But these are no answer to the separate-accrual rule. If a 
defendant fears indefinite liability, it need only cease its illegal 
conduct. Parties still have incentives to sue promptly, because 
the only kickbacks they may challenge are those given or taken 
within one year of their lawsuits. See Petrella, 572 U.S. at 671-
72. And whether one plaintiff has longer to sue than another 
depends only on whether a defendant has continued to harm 
him. 
5. Precedent supports our holding. Finally, JP Morgan in-
sists that both the Fifth Circuit’s precedent and our own require 
pegging the statute of limitations to the time of closing. See 
Cunningham v. M&T Bank Corp., 814 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2016); 
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Snow v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 332 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2003). 
But both cases accord with our holding today. 
We never resolved this issue in Cunningham because the 
parties treated the closing date as the accrual date. In that case, 
the plaintiffs recounted the same scheme as Blake and Orkis: 
that their mortgage insurers had given their banks a series of 
kickbacks for referrals. Cunningham v. M&T Bank Corp., No. 
1:12-cv-1238, 2015 WL 539761, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 
2015). We said in passing that the statute of limitations ran 
from “the closing of the loan.” Cunningham, 814 F.3d at 160. 
But the Cunningham plaintiffs had conceded that they had filed 
outside the statute of limitations. 2015 WL 539761, at *3. They 
argued only for equitable tolling. So we had no reason to inter-
pret the Act’s statute of limitations. 
And the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Snow supports our own. 
JP Morgan reads Snow as laying down a rule that the Act’s 
statute of limitations runs only from the mortgage closing. But 
Snow does not say that. In that particular case, the limitations 
period ran from the date of closing because that was the only 
date of a transfer—a different kind of violation from the kick-
back scheme alleged here. Snow, 332 F.3d at 359. And Snow 
acknowledged that in other cases, buyers could pay for a set-
tlement service “at a time other than the closing.” Id. at 359 
n.3. In that case, the trigger for the limitations period “presum-
ably would be the date of payment, not the unrelated closing.” 
Id. So each kickback has its own limitation period. 
 6. Blake and Orkis have alleged separate violations. Be-
cause the Act follows the separate-accrual rule, Blake and 
Orkis’s suit would have been timely in 2011. They claim that 
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JP Morgan accepted kickbacks until at least the end of 2010. 
And they allege that JP Morgan agreed to refer business to their 
mortgage insurers. So they have alleged that JP Morgan vio-
lated the act in 2010 by taking kickbacks under an agreement 
to refer settlement services. Their suit would thus have been 
timely in late 2011, but only for kickbacks paid in late 2010.  
III. UNDER AMERICAN PIPE, A PENDING CLASS ACTION 
TOLLS THE TIME ONLY FOR PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS’ 
INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS—NOT THEIR CLASS CLAIMS 
  Next, Blake and Orkis must bridge the time from 2011 
(when Samp was filed) to 2013 (when they filed their own class 
action). To do that, they seek American Pipe tolling because 
they were members of the putative Samp class. But in China 
Agritech, the Supreme Court reasoned that American Pipe toll-
ing is available only for individual claims, not for class claims. 
On appeal, Blake and Orkis raise only one theory to save their 
case: that China Agritech does not apply because they filed 
their class claims before Samp ended. But that distinction 
makes no difference. So their suit is untimely. 
A. China Agritech limited American Pipe tolling to indi-
vidual claims 
1. American Pipe tolling explained. The Supreme Court has 
long held that a timely class action tolls the claims of all puta-
tive class members. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 552-53; see 
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350 (1983). 
The Court has given two main reasons for its holding. First, 
tolling is needed to avoid duplicative lawsuits. American Pipe, 
414 U.S. at 551, 553-54. Putative class members should be able 
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to wait on the sidelines pending class certification, hoping for 
a victory in the class action. Without tolling, they might try to 
protect their claims by flooding courts with individual law-
suits—“precisely the multiplicity of activity which Rule 23 
was designed to avoid.” Id. at 551. 
Second, tolling is fair to both sides. Id. at 554. Statutes of 
limitations encourage plaintiffs to sue promptly and prevent 
surprises to defendants. But putative class members reasonably 
expect the class action to protect their claims. And the class 
action gives defendants ample notice. 
2. American Pipe tolling does not apply to new class ac-
tions. The Supreme Court has since limited American Pipe toll-
ing to individual claims. Courts may not toll new class actions 
just because there was a prior timely class action. China 
Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1811. Doing so would cause problems 
in three ways. 
First, tolling new class actions would breed duplicative 
lawsuits instead of reducing them. Id. at 1807. Plaintiffs could 
file new class actions after class certification was denied, un-
dermining Rule 23’s instruction to resolve class certification 
“early.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A)). Instead, they 
should file class actions “at the outset of the case.” Id. This lets 
courts resolve up front both whether to grant class certification 
and which plaintiff will lead the class, once and for all.  
Second, tolling new class actions would be inequitable. A 
would-be class claimant cannot say that he was hoping the first 
class action would protect his claim, because he could have 
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sought lead-plaintiff status or brought his own claim. See id. at 
1808. He would have “slept on [his] rights.” Id.  
And last, tolling new class actions would encourage repet-
itive claims. Id. at 1809. For new individual claims, any tolling 
is “finite, extended only by the time the class suit was pend-
ing.” Id. But new class actions would re-toll all class actions, 
letting class claimants stack their claims forever. 
 So “the rule [the Court] adopt[ed]” was unequivocal: “Time 
to file a class action falls outside the bounds of American 
Pipe.” Id. at 1811.  
B. It does not matter that Samp was pending when 
Blake and Orkis sued 
Blake and Orkis try to distinguish their case from China 
Agritech. They note that China Agritech’s posture was like 
American Pipe’s: the first class action had fully ended when 
the new plaintiffs filed their own action. See Resh v. China 
Agritech, Inc., 857 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d by 
China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. 1800. But Blake and Orkis filed 
their suit while Samp was pending on appeal. So they say that 
their case is distinguishable. 
But that is a distinction without a difference. To support it, 
they selectively quote a few sentences and phrases from China 
Agritech. For example, that case does say that Rule 23 “per-
mit[s] district courts to take account of multiple class-repre-
sentative filings.” 138 S. Ct. at 1807. And it explains that “mul-
tiple filings may aid a district court in determining, early on, 
whether class treatment is warranted.” Id. at 1811. But in con-
text, those statements mean only that plaintiffs should file their 
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class actions and sort out lead-plaintiff status within the statute 
of limitations. They presuppose “[m]ultiple timely filings.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Elsewhere, China Agritech is clear and unequivocal: courts 
may not toll new class actions under American Pipe, period. 
E.g., id. at 1811; see also In re Celexa & Lexapro Mktg. & 
Sales Practices Litig., 915 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2019) (sug-
gesting this view of China Agritech); Weitzner v. Sanofi Pas-
teur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 609-10 (3d Cir. 2018) (same). For ex-
ample, China Agritech “h[e]ld that American Pipe does not 
permit a plaintiff who waits out the statute of limitations to pig-
gyback on an earlier, timely filed class action.” 138 S. Ct. at 
1806. It explained that “Rule 23 evinces a preference for pre-
clusion of untimely successive class actions.” Id. at 1807. So 
“the Rules do not offer . . . a reason to permit plaintiffs to ex-
hume failed class actions by filing new, untimely class claims.” 
Id. at 1811. 
China Agritech thus recognized that district courts can deal 
with multiple filings and that additional filings may inform 
whether to certify a class. But that was all in the context of 
timely class filings. The Court meant only that class claimants 
should file their claims within the statute of limitations so that 
courts may decide up front whether to certify classes and which 
plaintiffs should lead them. It never suggested that courts 
should toll overlapping class actions. 
And Blake and Orkis’s distinction is at odds with China 
Agritech’s logic. Tolling new class actions filed while the first 
one was pending would encourage more plaintiffs to seek sec-
ond bites at the apple. Those plaintiffs also would have slept 
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on their rights. This would all undermine Rule 23’s instruction 
to resolve class certification early on. And it could lead to end-
less tolling, so long as each new class action overlapped the 
previous one. 
So Blake and Orkis’s proposed exception would swallow 
China Agritech’s rule: a timely class action tolls its purported 
class members’ individual claims, but never their class claims. 
In so holding, we do not reach amendments to putative class 
definitions, substitution of proposed class representatives, or 
intervenors and objectors seeking to join a class action. E.g., In 
re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 298 (3d Cir. 2010) (al-
lowing an objector to intervene under the relation-back doc-
trine). We also do not reach whether tolling applies to Blake 
and Orkis’s claims for individual relief even though they were 
filed before Samp ended, as Blake and Orkis offer no reason 
for their individual claims to survive other than those we reject 
above. Our holding today is limited to American Pipe tolling 
and its inapplicability to successive class actions.   
* * * * * 
 Blake and Orkis are right that, under the Act, each discrete 
kickback separately triggers its own limitations period. That 
means their suit would have been timely in 2011. But the pen-
dency of the Samp class action from 2011 to 2013 does not toll 
the time for filing a second class action. So their suit is un-
timely, and we will affirm.  
